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Abstract: This paper takes Udo Thiel’s The Early Modern Subject: Self-Conscious-
ness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume as an example of a study that 
aims to provide an account of a particular philosophical development, and dis-
cusses both the methodological requirements and the philosophical commit-
ments connected with this ambition. In a first step, I distinguish between two 
fundamentally different ways of thinking about philosophical development, viz. 
externalism and internalism with regard to historical developments in philosophy, 
and I consider two ways of defining the two respective positions. Next, I specify 
certain methodological decisions that are relevant when writing a study on a 
particular philosophical development, and I characterize Udo Thiel’s book with 
respect to them. While no definitive position is taken with regard to the issues 
raised, the paper does advocate a reflective approach to them.
Keywords: development, philosophical; progress, philosophical; context, con-
textualism; externalism/internalism
Udo Thiel’s book is an extensive study of a discussion that spanned more than a 
century on two core issues related to the concept of the human subject, i. e. con-
sciousness or self-consciousness and personal identity through time. Aiming to 
account for the development of philosophical discussions about these issues in 
early modern philosophy, Thiel examines a very broad range of primary sources 
and a great amount of secondary literature. More than other books covering such 
large time periods, Thiel’s study also engages with interpretive controversies.1 
Considering this impressive amount of material, I have decided to focus on some 
methodological issues in this review. Before addressing them, I would like to 
make a few remarks about the status of my concerns.
There are many different ways to do good research in the history of philos-
ophy, and most are valuable in some way or another. There are therefore many 
decisions to be made when one writes a book. However, it seems to me, these 
1 See also Marleen Rozemond’s review in the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews from 2012.
*Kontakt: Prof. Dr. Ursula Renz, Alpen-Adria Universität Klagenfurt, Institut für Philosophie, 
Universitätsstr. 65–67, A-9020 Klagenfurt /Universität Konstanz; ursula.renz@aau.at
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 08.02.17 10:59
 The idea of philosophical development   537
decisions are rarely taken in full awareness. This is often simply the result of 
serious engagement with the object of a study. If we are guided, as historians of 
philosophy, by the material we examine, it may happen that we arrive at quite 
unexpected points. Not only may we be confronted with findings that differ from 
those we’d hoped for, but, possibly, we may even be forced to adopt another per-
spective on the issue at stake. Things may develop in a surprising manner, such 
that it would be wrongheaded to require complete methodological transparency 
beforehand. But it is another thing to make up one’s mind about the principles 
implicitly driving a book one reads. The methodological questions I am raising 
here are primarily meant to clarify my own reading.
My overall concern is the methodological commitments involved in Thiel’s 
declared goal of accounting for some development. I will raise three questions 
related to this notion. Even though he is quite explicit at some points, it is not 
obvious how Thiel would have answered all these questions. It might thus be the 
case that in discussing the notion of philosophical development I ascribe a posi-
tion to him that differs from the one he would have adopted. Still, thinking about 
Thiel’s views on these issues is important for gaining a firm grasp of his project. 
For it seems to me that both the numerous merits and some of the more problem-
atic aspects of Thiel’s exposition essentially depend on them.
In his book, Thiel pursues a twofold aim. First, he wants “to provide an 
account of the development” of the topics of consciousness or self-consciousness 
and personal identity in the early modern period. Second, he wants to do this by 
explaining “the philosophical arguments in their historical context” (p. 3). Given 
the length of the period considered, this is an ambitious but not unreasonable 
goal. In my reading of the book, however, I was not quite sure about Thiel’s own 
understanding of this aim. In particular, Thiel never discusses what he means by 
“development”.
There is an unproblematic usage of this term. Obviously, when dealing with 
a certain period in the history of philosophy, one needs to have a certain under-
standing of what was going on in it. ‘Development’ may be used as a dummy term 
to denote the sum of changes and continuities in philosophical discussion about 
a topic during a considered time span.
The question arises whether this is a strong enough conception of devel-
opment to serve as a program for a philosophical study. Why do we have to 
know what was going on in the discussion of consciousness and personal iden-
tity during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rather than, let’s say, the 
seventh and eighth? Thiel’s answer to this question is clear. He points out, first, 
that “interest in the issues of self-consciousness and personal identity is certainly 
characteristic and even central to early modern thought” (p. 1). Second, and more 
important for our concern, he claims that “this is an interest that continues to 
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 08.02.17 10:59
538   Ursula Renz
this day, in a form still strongly influenced by the conceptual frameworks of early 
modern thought on these issues” (p. 1). The early modern period, he thus con-
tends, is crucial for the way in which we understand these issues today. This indi-
cates that Thiel thinks of the development he is depicting in a determinate way.
To elaborate on this in more detail, I shall discuss Thiel’s approach by means 
of the following three sets of questions.
a) First and foremost, the question arises what is it that we are after when we 
investigate a “philosophical development”? Are we looking for some philo-
sophical progress specified by some inherent goal? Or do we allege that some 
change amounting in a particular outcome is the result of external forces? Are 
we interested in historical or in a theoretical and conceptual development? 
Or do we think of an intellectual development in which historical and theo-
retical aspects are narrowly intertwined?
 At this point, it might be helpful to introduce some terminology I have 
encountered in Denmark in informal conversation. In analogy with several 
debates in analytic philosophy, we used to distinguish between two positions 
that we called internalism and externalism with regard to historical devel-
opments in philosophy. How can we define these notions? There are two 
options. On the one hand, we can say that these terms just mark two oppo-
site ideal-typical positions that are rarely realized in their pure forms. On the 
other hand, one can define them more strictly by stipulating that any histori-
cal explanation that sometimes accounts for a philosophical development in 
terms of conceptual or theoretical advancement follows internalism, whereas 
only approaches which always prioritize historicist explanations or exclu-
sively allow for external causes constitute the externalist camp. Yet, unlike 
in epistemological discussions, these terms are used in the history of philos-
ophy to clarify one’s methodological principles rather than to describe two 
distinguished theoretical views. They delineate our approaches and do not 
determine what constitutes a philosophical development. I therefore prefer 
to think of these terms as denoting ideal types of some sort; it goes without 
saying that most historians of philosophy practice a mixture of internalism 
and externalism. Finally, I would like to emphasize that my view is not that as 
a historian of philosophy one has to opt for one position once and for all, but 
I do think it is important to reflect upon this issue when one is out to examine 
a certain development.
 My interpretive question is thus the following: Is Thiel an externalist or an 
internalist with regard to the development of the issues of (self-)conscious-
ness and personal identity?
b) A second set of questions relates to the issue of the definition of the time 
period to be considered in order to account for a particular development. 
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When does a development start, and when does it end? What are the fea-
tures we take to play the definitional role here? Philosophical claims? Termi-
nological shifts? The rise of new thinkers? The publication and reception of 
key texts? The establishment of new scientific institutions? Political or his-
toric events? Further, how do we define the crucial steps of a development? 
Are they simply to be identified with the positions we ascribe to particular 
figures?
 Again, these considerations are connected with a concrete interpretive ques-
tion I have with regard to Thiel’s approach: How necessary, I wonder, given 
the issues he addresses, is his focus on the development from Descartes to 
Hume and, in particular, the culmination in Locke?
c) There is, finally, a third set of questions regarding the thematic unity of phil-
osophical developments. What are the criteria on the basis of which we take 
historical discussion on certain concepts to constitute one development 
rather than two or more? How can we decide which issues addressed under 
a certain title are intrinsically related to it and which, on the other hand, are 
only connected to it in virtue of some historical coincidence?
 In other words: Is Thiel’s focus on the issues of consciousness and personal 
identity when examining the development of the early modern subject philo-
sophically motivated, and if so how?
In providing an account of the development of the early modern subject, Thiel 
must have a view on all of these methodological issues, even though he does 
not answer the above questions explicitly. In what follows, therefore, I will try to 
identify his position by looking at the way in which he deals with some crucial 
issues.
Ad a). Regarding the first set of questions, one is tempted at first to think of 
Thiel’s approach as “externalist”. This is at least what he seems to indicate when 
declaring that he wants “to explain the philosophical arguments in their histori-
cal context” (p.3). On a closer look, however, things change. When talking about 
contexts, Thiel always and exclusively focuses on philosophical or related theo-
logical debates. He looks neither at political, nor at social contexts. Nor does he 
consider the development in other fields, such as the medical sciences or physi-
ology. If Thiel were committed to externalism, we would have to take this as a his-
torical statement. We would then have to ascribe to Thiel the (negative) claim that 
the debate was mostly or even solely driven by the dispute between philosophers 
and theologians, or theologically motivated philosophers. I cannot discuss here 
whether or not this is true. But let me point out that to the extent this is true we 
have to assume a fundamental difference between the discussion of these issues 
in early modern thought and the discussion of the same issues in contemporary 
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philosophy of mind. In twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy, the issue 
of consciousness is mainly debated against the backdrop of the ambitions of the 
neurosciences or, more generally, the cognitive sciences. The picture provided by 
Thiel’s study, in contrast, suggests that it was the theological concern of punish-
ment and reward in the afterlife which was driving the debate in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.
There is a second reason why, the emphasis on contexts notwithstanding, I 
took Thiel’s study to be internalist rather than externalist in spirit. Looking at his 
treatment of Locke, which is based, I think, on an excellent, illuminating, and 
original analysis of Locke’s position, Thiel is, it seems to me, both making a his-
torical claim and affirming a widespread philosophical tenet. The historical claim, 
which he more or less explicitly states, is this: There are views in early modern 
philosophy that essentially rely on the notion that there must be some pre-reflec-
tive way of being conscious of oneself and one’s mental states. Contrary to what 
was alleged by the so-called Heidelberg School, early modern philosophers did 
not account for self-consciousness across the board by proposing a ‘reflection 
theory’ (p. 16). There were, Thiel states, same-order accounts as early as the sev-
enteenth century, and not only, as claimed by Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank, 
at the end of the eighteenth century. I largely agree with this historical claim.
Somewhat surprisingly however, Thiel’s critique of the historical account of 
the Heidelberg School is connected with a move which strikes me as itself coming 
close to the accounts of the Heidelberg School. Thiel’s reading of Locke attributes 
an account to the latter which is committed to the very same systematic priority of 
same-order accounts over higher-order accounts as that defended by the propo-
nents of the Heidelberg School. That’s the philosophical tenet underlying Thiel’s 
study.
To be sure, there is nothing wrong with this. Obviously, that one makes use 
of a certain contemporary account in reconstructing a historical position does 
not preclude one’s also advocating that account. Furthermore, I would like to 
emphasize that Thiel makes a strong case for a reading of Locke that ascribes 
to Locke a view which does not fall prey to the fallacies usually associated with 
higher-order theories. Problems may arise, however, since we are dealing with a 
historical debate. It is rather difficult, I think, to do justice to all parties partaking 
in a debate when one prioritizes one contemporary model. This is not what Thiel 
does; yet he does something quite similar: He considers Locke, or rather the Locke 
he defends against the charges by the Heidelberg School, as a paradigm which 
is used not only to identify forerunners and allies, but also to judge the critics 
of Locke’s account. I must confess, I sometimes thought that a stronger case for 
those critics could be made if one were to identify the point of their concerns by 
analyzing them in terms of some other contemporary approach, instead of asking 
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whether they do justice to the conception Thiel ascribes to Locke. I presume, for 
instance, that some of the metaphysical arguments against Locke’s view on the 
subjective constitution of personal identity would turn out to be stronger than 
Thiel suggests, if they were analyzed in terms of Peter F. Strawson’s views on the 
concept of persons rather than in terms of Locke’s account.2
Ad b). I come now to the second set of questions relating to the definition 
of the time period considered in Thiel’s account of the early modern subject. It 
seems clear that, generally speaking, externalists with regard to the history of 
philosophy are in a better position to answer these questions, for they can simply 
focus on historical cornerstones. They can, as it were, adopt a positivistic attitude 
according to which one simply has to rely on certain historical facts.
The case is more delicate if one is committed to internalism. Many histori-
cal facts do not matter to our understanding of the internal logic of a develop-
ment. Certainly, insofar as the beginning and the end of some development is 
concerned, we may always adopt a pragmatic attitude. We may just begin with a 
position we take to constitute a promising starting point, and end after we have 
made our point. That is, it seems to me, the approach of Thiel’s book, which starts 
with Descartes, ends with Hume, and is complemented by some prehistory in the 
beginning and with a brief outlook in the end. Considering the particular steps 
of a given development, such a pragmatic approach is more prone to undeclared 
neglect of certain less regarded aspects. The danger of a pragmatic stance con-
sists, in other words, in the replication of our ignorance.
At this point, it has to be mentioned that generally speaking Thiel is more than 
safe from this objection. He deals with a huge amount of thinkers and debates 
which are usually considered marginal and which are unknown to many histori-
ans of early modern philosophy. Furthermore, when he engages in discussing the 
approaches of the big figures, he often provides a fresh view on them and does 
not simply adhere to common sense. This is true of his discussions of Descartes, 
Locke, and Hume. The chapters on these thinkers are all insightful and a great 
pleasure to read. This more than compensates for the fact that in his discussion 
of some other figures, Thiel largely repeats the standard view. One cannot expect 
a book to deal with everything in a new and original manner.
2 I had this idea in particular when I read Thiel’s discussion of Isaac Watt’s critique of Locke. 
To be sure, one cannot analyze his hypothesis of staminal particles in terms of Peter Strawson. 
But both the critique that Locke’s man-person distinction does not correspond to the nature of 
things and the point that a person must be identifiable by others can be argued for in terms of 
Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics.
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Nevertheless, there is a danger in this pragmatic approach, of which we have 
to be aware when we are dealing with philosophical developments from an inter-
nalist perspective. We tend to support the obvious, and neglect the hidden. To 
make my point clearer, I would like to mention one particularity of Thiel’s account 
that has struck me as both philologically right and philosophically problematic. 
When discussing the issue of consciousness, Thiel exclusively engages with the-
ories if and insofar as they make use of the terms ‘consciousness’, ‘conscience’, 
or ‘conscientia’. This may serve as a heuristic device, but we cannot take it as the 
sole indicator of a thinker’s interest in the issue of consciousness in early modern 
philosophy. As I have recently argued, for instance, Spinoza, in identifying the 
human mind with the idea of a particular body, presupposes a similar kind of 
pre-reflexive knowledge to what Thiel finds in Locke’s concept of consciousness. 
Yet, he nowhere uses the word ‘conscius’ or ‘conscientia’ in this context.3
Note that my point is not that it was Spinoza rather than Locke who first 
recognized the importance of pre-reflexive consciousness. I mention this simply 
to show that the development of ideas does not necessarily correspond to the 
development of terminology. Thus if one sticks with terminology, one may miss 
those points where philosophers were still struggling to express themselves in the 
right manner. Of course, this makes it even harder to identify certain steps within 
a philosophical development. But to the extent that one is interested in philo-
sophical developments from an internalist perspective, these points may be quite 
instructive since they may indicate situations where certain conceptual decisions 
were on the way, but not yet taken.
Ad c). I will address the last question about the thematic unity of the devel-
opment in the early modern period only briefly, and I will do so, primarily, by 
raising questions that may open up further perspectives on the topic of Thiel’s 
book. In the introduction, he refers to several topics which are all connected to 
the idea of human subjectivity. Besides self-consciousness and personal identity, 
he mentions “the mind-body-problem, questions concerning agency, self-deter-
mination, moral and legal responsibility, and also the possibility of knowledge of 
an external world and physical objects” (p.1).
3 See my Die Erklärbarkeit von Erfahrung. Realismus und Subjektivität in Spinozas Theorie des 
menschlichen Geistes, Frankfurt 2010, 189–196. Thiel, on p. 65, cites my book in one place with 
respect to the passage which deals with Spinoza’s usage of ‘conscientia’, where I argue that this 
term does not denote consciousness. But he missed my point that what is later referred to as 
‘consciousness’ plays an important role in the individuation of finite minds. In contrast to Thiel, 
I thus think that some notion consciousness, albeit not the term ‘conscientia’, performs a consti-
tutive function for the idea of the self of the person in Spinoza’s Ethics.
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In pointing out this whole range of issues, Thiel is obviously aware that he 
is making a selection here, even though he does not justify it explicitly. He does, 
however, justify his selection of particular thinkers – Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, 
Wolff, and Hume – in the light of his preference for these two features. There is 
thus a relation that is assumed to hold between these figures and the features 
selected as constituting the topic. This makes sense, for in all those figures there 
is a connection between the two issues. The question remains: why the prefer-
ence for these two features? Why not write a history that focuses on another set 
of features and puts other, less known, philosophers in the foreground? Why not 
examine, for instance, the connection between self-consciousness and agency? 
To provide an interesting account that centers on this connection, one would 
probably have to think of other thinkers. One would not necessarily have to 
discuss Descartes or Hume, but it would possibly be illuminating to examine the 
conceptual foundations of the Moralists, which are addressed, in Thiel’s book, in 
the space of less than a single page. To be sure, one might not encounter a great 
deal regarding the metaphysics of personal identity by reading, for instance, La 
Rochefoucauld, but one would probably gain a better understanding of the moral 
constitution of the self. This, in turn, might help to defend Locke against those of 
his critics who just could not see the point of his distinguishing between ‘person’, 
‘man’ and ‘soul’.
Looking at contemporary discussions, on the other hand, one might wonder 
whether what Thiel, together with the early moderns, refer to as consciousness or 
self-consciousness is really one singular feature. It strikes me that Thiel examines 
two different issues under this title, namely, self-knowledge and self-reference, 
or, in other words, the awareness of our mental life as contained in our first-per-
sonal knowledge of our own mental states and the incorrigible knowledge of 
our being the subject or maker of our mental states and attitudes. In contem-
porary philosophy, these are clearly separate issues, although there is of course 
some interdependence between the ways in which they are discussed. Follow-
ing Thiel’s picture, there seems to be no clear separation between these issues in 
early modern philosophy. I doubt whether this is really so. Surely, this difference 
is not always made explicitly, and there were positions that mixed up the two, 
but there were also philosophers who, under the same notion as others, were just 
focusing on the one rather than the other issue.
I cannot go into further detail here. Let me close by stating that it was by 
engaging with these questions that I came to see the impact of Thiel’s book. He’s 
not just telling another story of early modern philosophy of mind, but is engaging 
in a close examination of how certain issues related to the conceptualization of 
the human mind in early modern philosophy became what they are now regarded 
as being: key philosophical issues in their own right. Further, he is making a case 
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for the view that same-order accounts of consciousness were already present in 
early modern philosophy and did not simply arise, as is sometimes assumed, with 
German idealism or the phenomenological tradition. Thus even if there is not one 
clear-cut topic called “the early modern subject”, Thiel’s study lays the ground 
for interesting philosophical research on issues associated with this label.
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